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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the idea of metamathemati-
cal deduction in Hilbert’s program showing its dependence of epistemological
notions, specially the notion of intuitive knowledge. It will be argued that
two levels of foundations of deduction can be found in the last stages (in the
1920s) of Hilbert’s Program. The first level is related to the reduction – in
a particular sense – of mathematics to formal systems, which are ‘metamath-
ematically’ justified in terms of symbolic manipulation. The second level of
foundation consists in warranting epistemologically the validity of the combi-
natory processes underlying the symbolic manipulation in metamathematics.
In this level the justification was carried out with the aid of notions from mod-
ern epistemology, particularly the notion of intuition. Finally, some problems
concerning Hilbert’s use of this notion will be shown and it will be compared
with Brouwer’s notion and with the idea of symbolic construction due to Her-
rmann Weyl.
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This paper deals with the interplay between logic and philosophy
in Hilbert’s metamathematical program. It examines the idea of meta-
mathematical deduction in Hilbert’s program showing its dependence
of epistemological notions, specially the notion of intuitive knowledge.
The distinction will be made between two foundational levels or lay-
ers which can in fact be observed in the last stages (in the 1920s) of
Hilbert’s Program. The ﬁrst level is related to the reduction in a par-
ticular sense of mathematics to formal systems, which are ‘metamathe-
matically’ justiﬁed in terms of symbolic manipulation. This metamathe-
matical deduction led to a characterization of logic as a theory of formal
deductions that was fundamental for the historical development of the
proof-theoretical understanding of logic. The second level of foundation
consists in warranting epistemologically the validity of the combinatory
processes underlying the symbolic manipulation in metamathematics. In
this level the justiﬁcation was carried out with the aid of notions from
modern epistemology, particularly the notion of intuition. Finally, some
problems concerning Hilbert’s use of this notion will be shown and it
will be compared with Brouwer’s notion and with the idea of symbolic
construction due to Herrmann Weyl.
I
As generally known, Hilbert’s foundational program sets as its goal
the achievement of consistency proofs for mathematical theories. This
goal was pursued in every stage of it, from The Foundations of Geom-
etry of 1899 to the Foundations of Mathematics (Die Grundlagen der
Mathematik) of 1934 and 1938.In a certain sense, consistency seemed
to warrant the existence of mathematical objects and structures. This
supposition required notwithstanding some epistemological justiﬁcation.
Now, Hilbert began what Vittorio Michele Abrusci called the fourth
stage (at the beginning of the 1920s) of his program with a criticism
of Brouwer’s Intuitionism and Weyl’s related conception on the founda-
tions of mathematics (see [Abrusci 1978, 31 ﬀ.]). He critized especially
Brouwer’s idea of grounding mathematics on the Primordial Intuition
of Time in which the sequence of natural numbers is given (see [Hilbert
1922]). According to Hilbert such a subjective capacity could not be
the basis for mathematical knowledge. His own proposal to solve the
Grundlagenkrise in mathematics relied on symbolic manipulation as an
intersubjective and unquestionable basis for reconstructing mathemati-
cal theories by means of consistency proofs. This approach presupposed
the epistemological moment of formal abstraction from every content.
This symbolic manipulation constituted metamathematics, and its war-
rant laid in the ﬁnite point of view (or ﬁnitism). This conception estab-
lished which notions and statements were acceptable within the bounds
of as Hilbert and Bernays stated it in their opus magnum Die Gund-
lagen der Mathematik the conceivability in principle of objects and the
execution in principle of procedures [Hilbert & Bernays 1934, 32].
Thus, formal axiomatic systems were constituted by symbols consid-
ered as merely physical objects, and proof procedures were procedures
for symbolic manipulation. At a ﬁrst sight, the idea was very simple,
reasonable and it was consistent with common sense. As Hilbert stressed,
if mathematics is to be rigorous, only a ﬁnite number of in-
ferences is admissible in a proof - as if anyone had ever suc-
ceeded in carrying out an inﬁnite number of them [Hilbert
1926, 370].
Obviously, logical rules should also be counted as rules for procedures
of this kind. As Bernays expressed it in a paper written for a philosoph-
ical audience (I am referring to the paper “Die Philosophie der Math-
ematik und die Hilbertsche Beweistheorie”, from 1930), a proof should
be essentially characterized by the moment of combination. The logical
nature of inference rules, which it is shown by the real execution of the
proof, relies on this moment (see [Bernays 1930a, 334]). Logic is then
interpreted as the theory of formal deductions, an idea that would be
developed later in the framework of proof- theoretical accounts of logic.
These combination procedures needed an epistemological justiﬁcation.
This idea of founding mathematics on symbolic manipulation was
discussed within Hilbert’s circle of collaborators. For the question arose
how these procedures can be justiﬁed. It could be argued that the de-
velopment of a method for proving consistency of axiomatic systems
was properly a methodological goal. However, Hilbert himself (and also
Bernays) aimed to a philosophical framework for his program. Indeed,
it was noticed that the very notion of symbolic manipulation required
a philosophical justiﬁcation of its own, that is, to answer the question:
What led Hilbert to take formal (symbolic) systems as a source of a
secure and indubitable knowledge, since the abstraktes Operieren with
concepts and contents showed itself as uncertain and unreliable? In other
words, the epistemological reliability problem of the ﬁnitist method itself
was posed in Hilbert’s circle.
A possible solution to this problem could start from the notions of
symbolic manipulation and consistency themselves, arriving at some kind
of ‘intrasymbolic’ justiﬁcation. It could be regarded as a pragmatic jus-
tiﬁcation of some kind. The rules generating the formal system should
be viewed as deﬁning an object or a structure. A solution of this kind
could be rooted in some sense in a philosophical tradition stemming from
Leibniz and it was, in fact, suggested by Hilbert in the ﬁrst stage of his
program before the metamathematical turn. This point of view will be
also be found in Weyl’s foundational work (as it will be shown later).
However, Hilbert (together with Bernays at that time) explored an-
other solution based on the capacities of the knowing subject. This
decision was inﬂuenced by the philosophical context in which they were
situated, mainly in the kantian tradition, and perhaps by the discussion
with Brouwer. Finally, the desired justiﬁcation was found in the notion
of intuition [Anschauung]. In his conference on the new foundation of
mathematics Hilbert stated:
Instead, as a precondition for the application of logical infer-
ences and for the activation of logical operations, something
must already be given in representation [in der Vorstelllung]:
certain extra-logical discrete objects, which exists intuitively
[anschaulich] as immediate experience [Erlebnis ] before all
thought. If logical inference is to be certain, then these ob-
jects must be capable of being completely surveyed in all their
parts, and their presentation, their diﬀerence, their succes-
sion (like the objects themselves) must exist for us imme-
diately, intuitively, as something that cannot be reduced to
something else. [Hilbert 1922, 162 f.](English translation in
[Mancosu 1998, 202].)
This statement will be repeated in future writings. His famous paper
“On The Inﬁnite”, reads as follows:
... as a condition for the use of logical inferences and the
perfomance of logical operations, something must already be
given to our faculty of representation, certain extralogical
concrete objects that are intuitively present as immediate
experience prior to all thought. [Hilbert 1926, 376] (see also
[Hilbert 1931, 486]).
The “concrete objects” intuited were symbols and every manipulation
of symbols should also be intuited. In this sense, logic inference itself
must also be based on intuition as well, as Bernays observed in a pa-
per also aimed to a broad philosophical audience (“Die Grundgedanken
der Friesťschen Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zum heutigen Stand der
Wissenschaft” from 1930):
..., daß man schon die Logik als Theorie der Urteile uns
Schlüsse gar nicht ohne eine gewisse Heranziehung einer solchen
anschaulichen Erkenntnis entwickeln kann. Es handelt sich
dabei um die anschauliche Vorstellung des Diskreten, aus
der wir die primitivsten kombinatorischen Vorstellungen, ins-
besondere die der Sukzession entnehmen. [Bernays 1930b,
108]
The formal proofs of metamathematics are also intuitively grasped.
(As Hilbert stated in a later paper: “Ein Beweis ist eine Figur, die uns
als anschaulich vorliegen muß” [Hilbert 1931, 489].)
It is generally acknowledged that intuition plays an essential role in
the constitution of Hilbert’s ﬁnitism. Kurt Gödel in his Dialectica pa-
per of 1958 deﬁned ﬁnitary mathematics as that of intuitive evidence.
Hourya Sinaceur made use of the epistemological relation between intu-
ition and ﬁnitism in order to distinguish it clearly from the axiomatic
method: The ﬁnite logic of Hilbert must proceed intuitively [Sinaceur
1993, 252]. Charles Parsons also related both notions, stressing that the
main epistemological thesis of Hilbert’s program should rely on intuition
(see [Parsons 1998]). Now, the main point is to understand accurately
(i) what Hilbert really meant by intuitions and (ii) why he chose this
notion for the philosophical grounding of his ﬁnitism.
II
The notion of intuition has received diverse interpretations in the
history of philosophy. Intuition was always taken as a faculty or capacity
of knowledge which is applied, in the ﬁrst place, to objects: Intuition
of objects is a direct grasping of them as in perception. This grasping
can be sensible or intellectual. In a second sense, intuition serves to
determine the truth of statements or propositions. This is the case of
self-evident truths: the evidence for the truth of a sentence is given by
means of intuition. So, intuition comes to be a method for justifying
the truth of sentences. Obviously, if the truth of a sentence is justiﬁed,
then its truth can be asserted. For this reason, intuition is regarded as
a capacity of knowledge determining the truth of sentences.
The second sense relies on the ﬁrst: sentences whose truth is justiﬁed
by intuition refer to objects intuitively grasped. These intuitions should
be necessary conditions for the validity of logical deductions. These
intuition-grasped objects constituted the reliable and secure core for
ﬁnitary arithmetics, and there is no doubt that, according to Hilbert,
they were tokens, concrete symbols without meaning, such as strokes
or symbols like the string 1+1+1+1 deprived of its standard meaning
(see [Hilbert 1922, 163] and also [Hilbert 1926]). The combination of
these symbols by means of operations is the basis of ﬁnitistic arithmetic.
From this approach, an epistemological thesis underlying Hilbert’s pro-
gram can be rendered in the following two statements:
(1) If A is a true sentence of ﬁnitary arithmetic, then its truth can
be inferred from sentences whose truth is justiﬁed by intuition.
(2) Finitary arithmetic is intuitive arithmetic.
Both of them can be accepted as the main epistemological thesis
underlying Hilbert’s ﬁnitism.
At this point it must be clariﬁed in what sense deductions made
according the ﬁnite point of view are intuitive. With regard to this ap-
plication of the notion of intuition, two diﬀerent senses are traditionally
taken into account: (i) as applied to the justiﬁcation of the truth of
sentences, and (ii) as applied to the justiﬁcation of the correction for
deduction processes. In the ﬁrst case, deduction provides an intuitive
justiﬁcation of true sentences, that is, the last sentence of a deduction is
also justiﬁed by induction. In the second case, it is the process of rule ap-
plication constituting the deduction which is justiﬁed by intuition. The
ﬁrst sense is tenable only if one thinks that deduction preserve the intu-
itive character of sentences: If the premises of a deduction are intuitively
known, so is the conclusion.
This sense is highly debatable because of the fact that deduction is
not an immediate way of recognizing the truth of a sentence. It can be
observed that, classically, this sense was already discussed by Descartes
in Rule II of his Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Descartes distinguished
between intuition and deduction by indicating in the latter the existence
of a movement or succession of thinking. However, this movement in-
tuits each thing in particular (see [Descartes 1701, AT, X, 369]) and
the chain of steps brings the certainty of the last point. Each element
grasped in this movement is intuited. This leads to the second sense.
The correctness of each step in the deduction is justiﬁed by intuition.
And so, the intuitive character of the whole process can only be asserted
in a secondary or derivated sense. To sum up, it is not the ﬁnal result
of the deduction that is known by intuition, but it is each step that is
intuitively justiﬁed. This notion of intuition is used to characterized the
validity or correctness of each step in a deduction: the validity not only
of the basic rules but also of their application are justiﬁed by intuition.
Obviously, even if Hilbert’s idea of intuition ﬁts in the second sense,
some obscurities remain. For the notion of intuition did not receive in
Hilbert’s papers a proper analysis or elucidation. Of course, its relation
to ﬁnitary arithmetic gives us some clue: the potential inﬁnite, for ex-
ample, cannot be grasped by intuition, and in this point lies an essential
diﬀerence with Brouwer’s intuitionism.
Moreover, due to the historical background, the philosophical dis-
cussions in Hilbert’s circle made use of notions from the Kantian tra-
dition, particularly “the pure forms of sensibility”: the pure intuitions
of space and time. However, intuition can be better understood as em-
pirical perception, as symbols are concrete objects to be grasped by our
senses.(Kantian inﬂuence should be found better in Hilbert’s conception
of ideal mathematics.)
III
The deductive procedures in metamathematics also receive a justi-
ﬁcation by intuition. In a few words, in Hilbert’s metamathematics,
logical symbols represent operations performed on symbols themselves,
so that logical deduction is based on intuitive combinatorial principles.
Thus, it is possible to talk about a logic of ﬁnitary processes, a “concrete”
logic which is the subject of metamathematics. This leads to the idea of
a metamathematical meaning of logical symbols diverging from the ordi-
nary meaning: It is the meaning they have in formal proofs constructed
according to the ﬁnite point of view. In a paper of 1927, aimed to a broad
audience, Bernays regarded as universally valid rules such as the dictum
de omni et nullo, the modus ponens, the laws of non contradiction and
excluded middle and the principle of proof by cases. This acceptance
of the excluded middle implied the unproblematic character of ﬁnitary
negation. Hilbert himself expressed the same ideas (see [Hilbert 1923,
181]).
However, as it is well known, Hilbert himself saw quantiﬁed formu-
las as representing the knowledge about inﬁnite aggregates, departing
therefore from the realm of intuitive and ﬁnite thinking. This conviction
was motivated by Hermann Weyl’s rejection of the principle of excluded
middle due to his analysis of the meaning of quantiﬁed formulas in his
paper on the new foundational crisis of mathematics (see [Weyl 1921]) .
So, Hilbert wrote
Wo geschieht nun zum erstenmal das Hinausgehen über das
konkret Anschauliche und Finite? Oﬀenbar schon bei der
Anwendung der Begriﬀe ‘alle’ und ‘es gibt’. [Hilbert 1923,
181].
Although in Hilbert’s papers from that time we can ﬁnd some confu-
sion between metamathematical quantiﬁcation and quantiﬁcation over ﬁ-
nite domains (see loc. cit.), Hilbert explored from 1923 onwards diﬀerent
ways to deﬁne metamathematical quantiﬁers. Later, in the Grundlagen
der Mathematik, an universal judgement was interpreted ﬁnitarily as an
hypothetical judgement, whereas an existential judgement as a “partial
judgement” (Partialurteil), that is as an incomplete judgement. So, they
could not be considered as authentic judgements. Now, in the axiomatic
system he introduced in his paper of 1923 ﬁrstly occur quantiﬁer-free
number theoretic axioms, and then in a separate way what he used to
call transﬁnite axioms introducing quantiﬁcation. It must be noticed
that the ﬁnite point of view led to the exclusion of notions like arbi-
trary interpretation and satisﬁability, which serve usually to interpret
quantiﬁcation.
Basically, he introduced a choice function, the τ function, which ap-
plied to predicates served to choose an arbitrary element of the domain.
By means of this function, universal quantiﬁer could be deﬁned. In fact,
Hilbert called it a transﬁnite function (see [Hilbert 1923, 183]). Later, in
his paper “On the inﬁnite”, he proceeded in another fashion introducing
a choice function ǫ, and ∃xAx denotes an indeterminate function that
pick out an x for which A holds. In other words, this expression means
an x such that if anything has the property A, then x has that property.
The existential quantiﬁer could be then deﬁned explicitly as
∃xAx =df A(ǫxA)
Now, the terms obtained by both functions can only be applied a
ﬁnite number of times in a formal deduction, and consequently, the func-
tion could be ﬁnitarily interpreted (see the comments in [Goldfarb 1979,
361] and a full systematical account is to be found in [Leisenring 1969]).
Such a conception of quantiﬁcation should be enough for Hilbert’s
purposes. The choice functions expressed the meaning quantiﬁers had
within metamathematics. But, it cannot be sustained that these func-
tions convey necessarily an intuitive idea of quantiﬁcation. Intuition
serves only to justify metamathematical procedures, and therefore the
use of logical symbols in formal proofs, but it does not elucidate the
meaning of logical symbols in general. This idea can be accurately illus-
trated through a passage extracted from Bernay’s paper “Die Philoso-
phie der Mathematik und die Hilbertsche Beweistheorie”. This passage
is about the application of modus ponens in a formal derivation [Bernays
1930a, 335]. Let A and A * B be two formulas of the formal language,
which are not axioms. Then, there exists a sequence S of formulas lead-
ing to A and another sequence T leading to A * B, and the rule of modus
ponens allows the derivation of B. Thus, the purely formal coincidence
between the last formula of the sequence T and the formula obtained
from the last formula of S as antecedent and the derived formula as
consequent:
The coincidence, which is to be found in the present case,
cannot be directly read oﬀ from the content of the formal
inferences rules and from the structure of the initial formulas,
but rather it can be only be read oﬀ from that structure
obtained through the application of the inference rules, that
is, through the carrying out of the inferences. There exists
here in fact a combinatorial element. (loc. cit., (English
translation in [Mancosu 1998, 241])
IV
It can be observed that two levels coexist in the foundational ar-
guments of Hilbert’s Program. The ﬁrst level includes the reduction
of mathematics to formal systems, which are justiﬁed ‘metamathemati-
cally’, in terms of symbolic manipulation. This reduction is carried out
in a very special way, which has always been controversial and will not
be discussed here. It is parallel to the reduction of ideal mathematics
into ﬁnitary mathematics. It was in this level of foundation that Hilbert
found a solid basis for mathematical knowledge, attempting to solve the
foundational crisis. The second level of foundation consists in warrant-
ing the validity of the combinatory processes underlying the symbolic
manipulation in metamathematics. This level is more basic, connected
with perception of symbols and the operations carried out with them. It
is at this level where the notion of intuition appears.
The diﬀerentiation between these two levels can be suggested in the
discussion that took place after the lecture “Kritische Philosophie und
mathematische Axiomatik” given by the philosopher Leonard Nelson in
1927 in Göttingen. For Nelson, the function of consistency proofs was ba-
sically systematic and methodological, that is, the critical representation
of a logical relation between the axioms of a mathematical theory. On
the other side, the axioms should be justiﬁed by pure intuition (“gerecht-
fertigt werden die Axiome durch Berufung auf die reine Anschauung”,
[Nelson 1959, 122]). Bernays agreed with Nelson on the role of intuition
in mathematics, but he strongly objected the idea of founding mathe-
matics axioms on the kantian pure intuitions of space and time [Nelson
1959, 110]. Nelson replied that metamathematics must rest on an a pri-
ori intuition, namely the spatial intuition, since symbols are extensive
ﬁgures, given in a spatial order. Otherwise, if some kind of empirical in-
tuition were the basis, like the perception of the marks made by a chalk
on the blackboard, certain apodictic principles about symbols should be
needed. This is what Nelson ironically called the metaphysics of chalk
[Nelson 1959, 118]. This discussion shows the diﬃculties caused by the
introduction of intuition and reveals to what extent the notion of intu-
ition was not explicitly analyzed in Hilbert’s epistemological arguments.
Kant’s transcendental idealism established that intuition should be
some kind of construction in the subjectťs mind. As it is known, L. E.
J. Brouwer based his mathematical intuitionism on the idea of intuition
as construction. The ‘primordial intuition’ of the ‘two-oneness’ in time,
the repetition of objects in time is what generates the sequence of ﬁnite
ordinal numbers as mental constructions of the mathematical subject.
The locus classicus is Brouwer’s doctoral dissertation [Brouwer 1907].
Obviously, Hilbert’s and Brouwer’s ideas of intuition are quite apart
one from another. Hilbert made use of intuition in order to justify only
his metamathematics, while Brouwer pursued the idea of founding the
entire building of mathematics through intuition, leading him to the well
known restrictions in mathematical methods. Nevertheless, in another
aspects they are quite close. In fact, the idea of construction is es-
sential to Hilbert’s metamathematics, but it is a symbolic construction:
deductions and proofs are thought in terms of symbolic operations or
constructions. The justiﬁcation of metamathematics relies here on the
notion of symbolic construction itself and, more generally, on the human
capacity of constructing symbolic systems. Besides, it can be said that
these two levels mentioned above could have been uniﬁed in this idea of
symbolic construction.
This approach was sketched by Hermann Weyl in a philosophical
paper from the 1920s [Weyl 1925]. The main idea can be summarized
as follows. Weyl aimed to provide with a sense for the whole system
of mathematics (“mathematics as totality”), including transﬁnite mathe-
matics, which is impossible to understand intuitively and which was
also called by Weyl “theoretical mathematics”. According to him, this
“transcendent” part of mathematics could only represented by means
of symbols. Therefore, its knowledge would be some kind of “symbolic
knowledge” (even if this expression does not occur explicitly in Weyl’s
papers). And it could be regarded as a pragmatic point of view. He
wrote:
Without doubt, if mathematics is to remain a serious cultural
concern, then some sense must be attached to Hilbert’s game
of formulae, and I see only one possibility of attributing it
(including its transﬁnite components) an independent intel-
lectual meaning.[...] Theories permit consciousness to jump
over its own shadow, to leave the matter of the given, to rep-
resent the transcendent, yet, as is self-evident [wie sich von
selbst versteht ], only in symbols. [Weyl 1925, 540] (English
translation in [Mancosu 1998, 140])
If Hilbert is not just playing a game of formulae, then he as-
pires to a theoretical mathematics in contrast to Brouwer’s
intuitive one. [...] Yet beside Brouwer’s way, one will also
have to pursue that for Hilbert; it is undeniable that there is
a theoretical need, simply incomprehensible from the merely
phenomenal point of view, with a creative urge directed upon
the symbolic representation of the transcendent, which de-
mands to be satisﬁed. [Weyl 1925, 541] (English translation
in [Mancosu 1998, 140])
He argued for similar ideas in philosophical papers published later, in
the late forties and the ﬁfties: In the construction procedures, the idea
of (potential) inﬁnity is already included:
Die Zeichen werden nicht einzeln für das jeweils aktuell Gegebene
hergestellt, sondern sie werden dem potentiellen Vorrat einer
nach festem Verfahren herstellbaren, geordeneten, ins Un-
endlichen oﬀnen Mannigfaltigkeit vor Zeichen entnommen.
[Weyl 1953, 223]
It is the application of the symbolic system to natural science that
makes it reliable:
Wenn die formale Mathematik nicht mehr den Anspruch er-
hebt, wahre Behauptungen aufzustellen, so muß man sich
fragen, was sie dann überhaupt bezweckt [...] überzeugender
ist der Hinweis auf ihren naturwissenschaftlichen Gebrauch,
auf die Rolle, die sie beim konstruktiven Aufbau einer The-
orie der wirklichen Welt durch die Physik spielt. Denn hier
können wir uns auf die Bewährung der theoretischen Kon-
struktion durch Erfahrung und Voraussage berufen. [Weyl
1953, 226]
This approach is far from the notion of intuition as sense perception,
but it is close to the idea of intuition as symbolic construction. Again,
the basic idea would be that the procedures used in the construction of a
symbolic system are those which provide its epistemological justiﬁcation.
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